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ABSTRACT: During the nineteenth century, the jails, penitentiaries, 
and reformatories of Am erica were "industrialized" under both public and 
private production regimes. Society-centered revisionist writing in both 
sociology and history has failed to explain adequately the appearance, 
consequence, and ultimate dismantling of these regimes. In this paper I 
offer an alternative, state<entered analysis which locates the political state 
within Us interdependent relationship with the economic and normative 
spheres of society. My view underscores the role of state managers and 
agents as historical subjects whose actions have consequences for the struc­
turing of the state apparatus. 
The history of public policy in the United States concerning the control of the 
criminal, the deviant, the idle, and otherwise troublesome populations has 
been a cyclical one of "reforms," "innovations," and "solutions." Until 
recently, reformist historiography assessed these policy movements as the 
result of shifts in ideological currents, often stressing the actions of benevolent, 
forward-thinking progressives in shaping a more humane social world (cf. 
McKelvy [1936] 1977; Schneider and Deutsch 1941; Zilboorg and Henry 1973). 
This was a history of progress, a history of unquestionable allegiance to 
scientific humanism and social intervention. Today, a body of "revisionist" 
sociology and history challenges this perspective with a "determination to 
locate the reform enterprise in the social, economic and political context of 
the period" (Cohen and Scull 1983:2)/ 
While revisionist writers have taken us beyond the "history of progress" 
paradigm, they have yet to offer a systematic analysis of the role of the state 
in the historical transformation of institutional control practices—referring 
narrowly to those activities, from imprisonment to mental hospitalization, 
by which certain populations are removed from the everyday life of society.2 
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Paradoxically, this situation exists despite the fact that many take the central-
ity of the state as a given. As one group of authors recently put it, "It is 
obvious that a theory of the state must be central to any analysis of social 
control in . . . capitalist societies since the state has assumed direct responsi­
bility for supporting the institutions of control" (Lowman, Menzies, and 
Palys 1987:5). And yet, many writers, in their attempt to unearth the "real" 
basis of social control policies, have lost sight of the day-to-day realities of 
the state and the interests of those who administer these "institutions of 
control." 
In actuality, revisionist writers have offered "society-centered" rather 
than "state-centered" inquiries. Within society-centered analyses—whether 
pluralist, liberal, or Marxist—society is the initial and principal object of 
inquiry and the state is derived from or reduced to an arena of competing 
interest-group politics, a reflection of class relations, and the like.3 Alter­
natively, more "structural" perspectives on the state have portrayed its exist­
ence and function as taking place "behind the backs" of actors. That is, 
action, and hence human agency, is reduced to structural "adjustments" or 
the "imperatives" of capitalist production. This society-centered revisionism 
is reflected, for example, in what little contemporary writing there has been 
on the development and use of penal labor in the nineteenth century. Here 
the questions that remain at issue are: why was it that, during this period, 
many prisons came to resemble the factory? That is, why did the organiza­
tion of penal labor—based on commodity as well as agricultural production 
—mimic capitalist organization in work, time, discipline, and profit motive?4; 
whose interests did this resemblance serve?; and, finally, what accounts for 
the ultimate failure of the state to "industrialize" correctional facilities with 
the aid of private capital? 
For Melossi and Pavarini ([1978] 1981), for example, what they call the 
"prison/factory" emerged not out of economic utility, but rather as a "dis­
ciplinary apparatus" with a human product to produce. The authors state 
that the genuine aim of prison labor was 
the transformation of the criminal into proletarian. Thus the object was not so 
much the production of commodities as the production of men. From this 
point of view we can see the real dimension of the 'penitentiary invention:' 
a prison as a machine capable of transforming, after close observation of the 
deviant phenomenon, . . . the violent, troublesome and impulsive criminal 
(real subject) into an inmate (ideal subject), into a disciplined subject, into a 
mechanical subject" (1981:144, emphasis mine). 
Here the authors attempt to link the prison and the use of prison labor to 
the rise of capitalism, its work organization, and the reproduction of class 
relations. They argue that the inability of officials to turn the prison into a 
viable factory was the result of the disenchantment of private capital with 
the venture on the one hand, and organized working-class resistance on the 
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other (1981:142). The role of the state and the interest of state managers, 
however, goes unexamined, essentially reduced to a managerial, if not 
implicitly instrumental role, in the reproduction of a bourgeois social order. 
In a similar yet broader analysis, Foucault ([1975] 1979), argues that the 
economic effect of prison labor is not in the activity of production itself but 
that by "producing individuals mechanized to the general norms of an indus­
trial society. ... [it constitutes] a power relation, an empty economic form, a 
schema of individual submission and of adjustment to a production appara­
tus" (1979:242-243, emphasis mine). Rather than an instrument of a particu­
lar class, however, Foucault sees the prison and its correctional apparatus as 
an extreme form of a disciplinary savoir permeating the entire social formation. 
Given the sweeping and abstract nature of Foucault's project, however, the 
state remains in a shadowy and undertheorized position. Finally, in Roth-
man's (1980) view, prison labor is interpreted as a practical and generally 
popular enterprise with reformers, the public, administrators, and legislators, 
each having a different vested interest in its successful operation. While 
Rothman underlines the importance of prison labor for state managers, his 
emphasis is on drawing out the internal paradoxes of this activity: the ten­
sion between "conscience and convenience." But I would argue that a more 
robust explanation must also locate changes in the use of correctional labor 
within the broader political and economic arena and the shifting boundary 
between the state and civil society. 
. My purpose in this essay is to reinterpret the history of prison labor schemes 
within an alternative, state-centered perspective. This view acknowledges a 
distinct political sphere in society with a separate yet structurally inter­
dependent relationship to the economic and normative spheres. Further, I 
analyze state action within the context of contradiction and crisis manage­
ment and explicitly assume that state managers have, with few exceptions, 
an institutionalized self-interest in the reproduction of both the state and the 
wider social formation; a dual investment which must be constantly negoti­
ated under changing historical contexts.3 Thus, rather than reducing the state 
to an arm of the ruling class, or characterizing it as a lifeless reactive 
mechanism, this analysis seeks to focus on the political body in its own right 
as the vehicle of social policy. In this way, I account for the appearance, 
evolution, and eventual dissolution of prison labor schemes within the social 
structuring of the state apparatus. I first sketch a theoretical framework 
consistent with a state-centered analysis, and, second, I link these ideas to 
the specific problem of U.S. penological practice throughout the nineteenth 
century. 
STRUCTURE, AGENCY, AND THE STATE 
My analysis is guided by a number of theoretical issues concerning the 
development of the modern state. This agenda centers on the questions of 
the historically specific form the state takes, the functions or activities it 
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engages in, and mechanisms or apparatus through which functions are exe­
cuted (Clark and Dear 1984). The question of form addresses how and why a 
specific state is constituted by, and evolves within, a given social formation— 
in this case, nineteenth century American liberal-capitalism.6 In actuality, we 
see the development of two liberal-capitalist state forms during this period, 
involving three primary functions: (1) securing social consensus by guaran­
teeing the acceptance of the prevailing contract by all social groups; (2) 
ensuring conditions of economic production and social consumption; and 
(3) and providing a minimum degree of social Integration by guaranteeing 
the general welfare of all groups. The first state form (roughly 1790-1860) 
was the "Accumulative State," a transition state, reflecting a compromise 
between the new liberalism and the old order, which took an active role in 
ensuring economic development and establishing public order until about 
I860.7 Like many "new" states, a claim to legitimate political authority de­
pends on demonstrated effectiveness in these areas. 
State intervention for the sake of economic development took a number of 
direct and dramatic forms during the period. The most striking examples 
were in state financing, the creation of "mixed" public/private enterprises, 
and in assuming direct ownership of much of the country's transportation, 
banking, and even of some large commercial enterprises.5 These activities 
had specific consequences for the organization of penal institutions, the 
state's primary response to the problem of public order. The Accumulative 
State, then, was an interventionist state. It extended itself into diverse social 
and economic arrangements, creating the basis for both economic develop­
ment and the conditions of its own reproduction. 
The second state was the "Bureaucratic State" (roughly post-Civil War to 
about 1915), a reformist state which resulted from the success of the Accumu­
lative State. That is, with economic development and industrialization came 
sharper class divisions, recurring economic depressions, and, with them, 
problems of legitimation. The period was characterized by a strong laissez-
faire ideology, the rise of both organized capital and labor, and eventually, 
muckraking journalism and social and political reform. This reform move­
ment attacked the corruption of party patronage or the "spoils" system, 
advocating revision of civil service procedures and accountability. Such 
"rationalizing" reforms were intended to make the administrative structure 
of the state more efficient and manageable. Building social consensus and 
securing social integration became primary functions of this state form.9 
I view the penal system as part of the state apparatus or the set of organiza­
tions and institutions through which state power is exercised and state objec­
tives are realized. The various agencies of the state represent the concrete 
form of state power; as such, they constitute a bureaucratic medium which 
necessarily shapes and transforms the actual exercise of state power. Once 
established, such organizations may take on a logic and interest of their 
own, creating a "slippage" between their intended function and existence. 
Moreover, as a concrete form, the policies and activities of the apparatus are 
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vulnerable to being influenced by outside groups with their own agenda. 
Here we may observe sequences of alliances—more or less temporary and 
policy specific—between the state managers and those groups outside the 
state over the policies exercised by the apparatus. Thus, not only must we 
explore the relationship between these institutions of the state and state 
functions, but we must comprehend their own internal organizational logic 
and inertia, the extent to which they mediate the exercise of state power, and 
their relationship to civil society. 
Therefore, I want to locate my assessment of nineteenth century penologi­
cal practice within the policy-making capacity of the state itself. My argument 
is that attempts by state governments to "privatize" the industrial operation 
of the penitentiary were consistent with the functional objectives of the 
Accumulative State form. Yet embedded in such activities are contradictions 
or the unintended consequences of social action.10 That is, both the form of 
a given state and the functional objectives of consensus, production, and 
integration are not necessarily congruous, but rather are potentially contra­
dictory. For example, while the liberal-capitalist state must "crisis manage" 
social and economic development, it is, by definition, a state form which is 
restricted through legal, political, and cultural norms from "interfering" in 
civil society. The functions of the state may operate at cross-purposes as 
state managers attempt to balance competing political claims. For example, 
repressive tactics aimed at ensuring consensus may alienate certain groups 
and thereby threaten integration and political legitimacy. The state appara­
tus exhibits internal, contradictory tendencies as well. Here organizations 
may take on their own inertia, perpetuating the interests of those who man­
age them rather than adapting to new policy directions. Further, the appara­
tus may consume increasing amounts of state resources, thereby creating 
potential fiscal crises (O'Connor 1973). 
The logic of my theory/method is that the contradictions and the unintended 
consequences of state action, engender new problems requiring further action 
but under new historical circumstances. Thus, subsequent policy initiatives 
reflect adjustments to the accumulated contradictions of past actions and the 
attempts by state managers to balance their objectives with the material, 
legal, and administrative capacity available to them. A history of the nine­
teenth century penitentiary recounts the evolution of a particular state 
apparatus, while illustrating the relationship between the form and function 
of the liberal-capitalist state, and reveals the struggles of state managers 
attempting to cope with the unintended consequences of the past while 
reproducing the state and their positions in the present. 
THE "PROBLEM" OF PRISON LABOR 
It cost Americans little to incarcerate criminals in the immediate post-Civil 
War period (Mohler 1925; Mittleman [1921] 1966; Rothman 1980). Most 
responsible was the use of inmate labor to defray costs. In fact, penal labor 
380 SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES Volume 33, Number 3,1990 
contributed to minimal outlays and balanced books and, in some cases, 
produced profits between roughly 1830 and the 1880s (Commons [1921] 1966). 
However, by this time, penologists, criminologists, legislatures, and the 
public were engaged in a debate about the conditions under which prisoners 
would work. Few questioned the notion that prisoners should work—that 
was a given. As one participant at the National Prison Association meetings 
of 1883 stated, "I take it for granted there are no gentlemen in this room that 
do not hold to the idea that there must be labor in prison. It is simply a 
matter of labor, or supporting the convicts in idleness" (National Prison 
Association [NPA] 1884:183). Two years later, a Chicago Correctional Super­
intendent stated in his address to the Association: 
We are here today as scientists, reformers and business men. As such, in a 
trio sense, we are to discuss Prison Labor. We are agreed, that the physical 
employment by criminals is essential to their health, happiness, and reform. 
. . . But we are not agreed as to the system of employment. . . . Economic 
questions largely control our views (NPA 1887:217). 
Indeed, the debated question of the 1880s concerning prison labor was 
under which system of production the work would be organized. By 1885, 
roughly five production "regimes" (Burawoy 1983; Staples 1987) existed for 
organizing the labor of America's penal systems.11 According to the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics these were: (1) the lease, (2) the contract, (3) the piece-
price, (4) the state-account, and (5) the state-use system (U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics 1925). While the adoption of a particular regime reflected the 
political and economic history and circumstances of a particular state (and 
multiple systems often co-existed within the same state), the proportion of 
inmates involved in each production system varied considerably over time. 
A state-centered analysis suggests that the establishment of the lease, contract, 
and piece-price arrangements reflected various alliances created by state 
managers with a segment of private capital in order to confront the problem­
atic nature of institutional policies for the liberal-capitalist state. 
Under the lease system, inmate labor was sold to the highest bidder for a 
fixed period. The state abdicated all responsibility for prisoners to the lessee, 
including the provision of food, shelter, and control. The system became 
widely adopted throughout the United States, and particularly in the South, 
as a substitute for African slavery in agriculturally-based production schemes. 
The contract system was similarly embraced bv prison authorities. Under 
this regime, inmates toiled within the walls of the prison in factory shops 
which were set up by the administration, but were run by outside contrac­
tors and their foremen. The contractor supplied the raw materials and paid 
the state a fixed rate for every day worked and for the number of prisoners 
employed. The piece-price, a variation on the contract scheme, was adopted 
in only a few states. Here the state retained complete control over the labor 
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process. The contractor provided the raw materials and manufacturing specifi­
cations but had no employees within the walls of the institution. Inmate 
labor was sold by the number of pieces produced. 
Finally, two solely public arrangements were the state-accounts and state-
use systems. Under the state-accounts model the state assumed "the role of 
the entrepreneur . . . entering fully into business with all its risk and un­
certainties" (Robinson 1931:95). The state incurred capital costs, procured 
raw materials, organized and controlled the labor process, and marketed 
and sold the final products. The state-use scheme was identical to the state-
accounts system with the exception that prison-produced products were not 
sold on the open market. Rather, goods and services provided by inmate 
labor were used within the institutions themselves or were consumed by 
state agencies. Public works projects benefited from this arrangement as 
inmates were used in the construction of roads, railways, public buildings, 
and even other prisons. 
In order to understand the debates of the 1880s concerning the varied use 
of these production regimes, it is essential that we understand how and why 
they developed, consider the conditions under which they were employed, 
and reveal the contradictions that undermined and changed them. In doing 
so, I wish to demonstrate how state managers initiated these various prison 
labor schemes in an attempt to balance their own administrative, fiscal, and 
legitimation problems and how and why this extension of state power ulti­
mately failed as public policy. 
THE ORIGINS OF THE PRISON AS "FACTORY" 
The American prison emerged as a "republican machine" (Dumm 1987), 
constitutive of liberal democratic values and founded on the assumption that 
the state possessed the power to deny an individual's freedom. Laboring 
within the walls of America's penal institutions dates from the Colonial 
period (Ives 1914; Mohler 1925; Lewis [1922] 1967; Rothman 1971).12 The 
notions of "hard labor" and penal servitude were grounded in moral, legal, 
practical, and, as time went on, increasingly economic foundations. As a 
representative of the Philadelphia Society for Alleviating the Miseries of 
Prisons, a reformist organization rooted in Quakerism, urged before the 
state legislature in 1788, "solitary confinement to hard labor and a total 
abstinence from spirituous liquors will prove the means of reforming these 
unhappy creatures." "All prisons should be workhouses," they declared, as 
the basis for both punishment and reformation.13 
By 1790, Pennsylvania had stipulated in its penal code that prisoners would 
work in the recently erected cell house of the Walnut Street jail. By engaging 
their charges in labor, jailers could count on a more disciplined environment, 
while the products derived from the inmates' labor would offset the cost of 
confinement. At Walnut Street, prisoner accounts were debited for the cost 
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of clothing, upkeep, and raw materials. To "encourage industry as evidence 
of reformation" their accounts were credited with the proceeds of their labor, 
and, if there was an excess over costs, they were to receive half upon their 
release (Barnes 1927:164). Few among prison officials and politicians expected 
a profit from the institutions at this time; Massachusetts Warden Bradford 
called his prison a "benevolent institution" deserving of state support (Hindus 
1980:164). Prisons had few marketing links to the outside for their products, 
the labor process was based on handicraft production, and the intended 
purpose of forced labor was one of deterrence, reformation, and control 
rather than profit maximization. Virtually all prisons were run on public-
accounts systems. 
During the first three decades of the nineteenth century, the United States 
experienced dramatic population growth and urbanization. Between 1790 
and 1830, the nation's population more than tripled from nearly four to almost 
thirteen million. By 1830, half a million people lived in urban areas with 
populations exceeding fifty thousand residents (U.S. Bureau of the Census 
1960:12-14). In Philadelphia, the transfer of felons from rural counties had 
the effect of swelling the numbers in the Walnut Street jail and soon the 
moral regime of solitary, hard labor, diet control, and hygiene was in disarray. 
Eventually, conditions at the jail erupted into a political crisis for the state 
legislature as jail inspectors began pardoning prisoners to alleviate over­
crowding. Moreover, abuses and neglect were exposed and serious riots 
took place in 1817, 1819, 1820, and 1821. In the uprising of 1820, nearly the 
entire prison population escaped (Barnes 1927:155). 
The result was condemnation of the Walnut Street jail by the Philadelphia 
Society for Alleviating the Miseries of Prisons. This denunciation was sum­
marized in a Report of the Commissioners on the Penal Code which stated 
that conditions had caused the prison of Philadelphia to "forfeit the high 
character it once possessed, and to become a reproach to the city in which it 
was located, and to the state by whom it ought to be superintended."14 The 
ideals of liberal-democratic discipline had confronted the day-to-day realities 
of the liberal-capitalist state. Yet, rather than change direction, the state 
pressed on and influential people in and out of the state called for the 
building of new penitentiaries. Undertaking the most ambitious public works 
program in Pennsylvania's history to date, the Western and Eastern facilities 
were erected by the laws of 1817 and 1821, marking the beginnings of the 
state's prison "system" and thus a major expansion of its penal apparatus. 
Both institutions adopted handicraft production within cells, by law, in 1829. 
The situation was similar elsewhere as other states increased their commit­
ment to institutional punishment. Such expansion, however, only increased 
the already deficit-ridden prisons. According to Mittleman ([1921] 1966), in 
addition to construction costs, the Philadelphia prison operated at an aver­
age annual loss of $30,000, and in New York, from 1797 to 1821, the state 
prison at New Gate ran an average annual loss of just under $17,000. At the 
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first New Jersey state prison at Trenton, losses in the 1820s ran $3,000 to 
$4,000 annually. In fact, the prison cost the state $165,000 over thirty years, 
one-third the total state tax revenues for the period (Barnes 1918:72). With 
the rise of the merchant-capitalist class, the expansion of markets, and a 
shortage of cheap labor (prior to the massive immigration of the mid-1800s), 
the prison became an attractive setting for the developing industrial model. 
Meanwhile, prison and state officials were looking for ways of deferring 
rapidly increasing costs. The implications were clear: 
In the late twenties and early thirties, a re-organization in the prisons took 
place and the modern prison system was launched . . . Instead of working 
them [inmates] in small shops under 'mutual inspection,' large shops were 
erected in the prison court yards where supervision and discipline were easy. 
'A single overseer,' says the Boston Prison Discipline Society, describing the 
new shops at the Massachusetts prison, 'really does more to prevent evil 
communication between one hundred men in this shop, than ten overseers in 
. . . the old brick building.' Instead of manufacturing on their own account, 
the prisoners were now let out to contractors (Mittleman [1921] 1966:345). 
In 1819, three years after its construction, and by order of the state 
legislature, the New York penitentiary at Auburn was the first to adopt the 
new system of contracted, "joint labor" by day, and solitary by night. Auburn 
turned a profit by 1828.15 A keeper there stated: "great risk and losses are 
avoided, and much private capital, and personal interest and enterprise, are 
brought into action, in promoting the active and profitable employment of 
the convicts" (Mittleman [1921] 1966:346). Since prisoners worked in congre­
gate shops during the day and were confined to cells only at night, the 
Aurburn plan, it was argued, afforded lower construction costs and a more 
efficient use of space. The less time prisoners spent in isolation, the smaller 
and more austere the cells could be, and the constant surveillance provided 
by the centralized production not only prevented "evil communication," but 
more important, ensured strict control and discipline over the labor process. 
This regime was embraced in many states; soon to follow were Connecticut, 
Ohio, Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont. After all, state governments 
were actively involved in "mixed" (public/private) economic ventures in 
other spheres, why not also in the prison? By merging the domain of state 
control with the interest of private capital, the state had created a unique 
social form; indeed, a new form of state apparatus and a reconstitution of 
state power. 
In contrast, the Pennsylvania penitentiaries refused to adopt the new meth­
ods (although they did, on occasion, "yield to temptation," according to 
Barnes [1927:240], and engage In piece-price arrangements). Dedicated to 
the notion that inmate labor was primarily for purposes of reformation and 
not profit, officials debated the ethics of prison labor with their colleagues. 
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Steeped in the reformist and philanthropic philosophy of the early Quakers, 
the argument of some Pennsylvania officials was that the state and society 
were best served when the penal apparatus produced, as Beaumont and 
Tocqueville put it, the "deepest impression on the soul of the convict" 
(1833:59), rather than be concerned with what they considered short-term 
interests of cost. At the Eastern facility outside Philadelphia, Inspector Richard 
Vaux voiced again and again throughout his long career his objections to the 
Auburn system of factory production. For example, in 1855, he stated: 
The labor here, is not farmed out as in some State Penitentiaries. . . . The 
prison authorities, by the operation of this [Auburn] plan, have a divided 
duty. They are bound to the contractor for the labor he exacts for his per diem 
paid for each convict. This is the most important interest. The care of, and the 
discipline, and the reformatorial influences which ought to be faithfully exerted 
for the benefit of the convict, as well as society, being less palpable when in 
contrast with revenue, it might most naturally happen that the contractor is 
favored to the detriment of the convict.16 
And later: 
It is believed that the congregation of convicts during their incarceration for 
crime-punishment, and their sale to the highest bidder as human machinery, 
out of which profit is to be made, is of far greater evil to society, than society 
yet fully comprehends.1 
Steadfast in their resolve, Eastern Penitentiary officials argued the virtues 
of their system before their lawmakers. In 1837 they stated: 
The Inspectors assure the Legislature, that if permitted to develop itself fully, 
under the fostering influence of that policy which has always been extended 
to it by the Legislature, that the time is not far distant, when the Penitentiary 
system of our State, will be regarded among the proudest monuments of the 
wisdom of her people.18 
Apparently persuaded by the inspectors' arguments (and seriously con­
strained since the structure of the facility would not permit congregate shops), 
the state continued to support and subsidize the Eastern facility. And pay 
they did. Year after year the institution posted deficits. As Barnes (1927:287) 
put it: 
Never in its history has the Eastern Penitentiary failed to be a burden upon 
both the state and counties . . . [it] was wholly comparable to the many 
pathetic cases in the last century where handicraft artisans maintained a 
proud but losing and hopeless competition with the irresistible march of 
mechanical invention and labor-saving machinery. As time went on . . . the 
struggle became palpably disastrous in a financial sense. 
IN THE INT EREST OF THE STATE 385 
The case of New Jersey demonstrates the forces that ultimately settled the 
debate over the system of prison organization, in this state, the apparent 
failure of the first state prison—both in terms of its supposed deterrent 
capacity and its cost—prompted an investigation by a joint committee of the 
legislature in 1830 which concluded "with entire unanimity the building of a 
new prison, on the general plan of those at Auburn, New York."15 Yet, by 
1833, both the legislative committee and the governor had changed their 
position to support the Eastern Pennsylvania model rather than the Auburn 
plan. The committee, in outlining its advocacy of the Pennsylvania system of 
solitary confinement and labor, argued that the "great terror" known to 
have been "impressed upon the minds of the convict community by this 
Institution [would]. . . hold out the most powerful repellant to the commis­
sion of crime" within the state.20 The committee contended that concern for 
profits must be held "subsidiary to the great ends of punishment," although 
at the same time they assured the legislature that within the Eastern facility 
"a convict can in six months earn his maintenance." The new state prison 
with solitary confinement for 150 convicts was opened in 1836 at the cost of 
$179,429. Yet just four years later, the prison cost nearly $16,000 annually to 
operate. From 1841 to 1858 a piece-price contract system was installed and 
the debt reduced to $1,000. Actions by the governor and the legislators in the 
early 1860s expanded congregate workshops and permitted the leasing of 
inmate labor to private contractors, thereby adopting, if n ot in name but in 
spirit, the Auburn system. 
Interestingly, at Pennsylvania's Western Penitentiary, administrators were 
less enamored with the handicraft, state-accounts regime of their Eastern 
counterparts. As early as 1836 the inspectors, who were responsible for 
overseeing the industrial production of the prison, complained of the lack of 
efficiency of the solitary system. By the 1860s their attacks were increasingly 
vigorous. "Discard your cell labor," they declared, "change your separate 
system and adopt the congregate, and you will be able to use the muscle and 
skill of the prisoner much more to the advantage of the Commonwealth."21 
Conditions were ripe for the changeover as the post-Civil War era brought 
increased populations, an industrial depression, overcrowding, and a bleak 
financial picture for the prison. In 1866, the inspectors argued that the legisla­
ture had two choices: adopt the new system or build new cells to support the 
solitary system. In 1873, a contract system of congregate shops with mecha­
nized production was installed at the Western Penitentiary. Clearly, one 
contradiction embodied in the Pennsylvania system was the fiscal pressures 
it brought politicians; there can be little doubt that this contributed to its 
unpopularity and eventual demise. 
With the exception of the Eastern Penitentiary of Pennsylvania and, for a 
short period of time, the New Jersey system, private contractors, either 
under the contract, lease, or piece-price regimes, dominated prison indus­
tries from roughly 1830 to the postbellum period. It would seem that the 
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vast majority of state managers had, by adopting the Auburn system, suc­
cessfully intervened and responded to the potential problem of the "danger­
ous classes." They created social consensus by securing order and stability in 
society, permitted the protection of commerce in accordance with civil law 
and thereby ensured conditions of private production. Moreover, by forging 
an alliance with a segment of private capital, state managers were able to 
defer the financial cost of expanding the state apparatus. They had, in essence, 
successfully reproduced the conditions of their existence and legitimation. 
As Rothman (1980:27) notes: 
All the parties liked the arrangement. The state had the guarantee of an 
income without incurring risks or capital costs: it was the contractor that 
supplied the machinery, the goods and the supervisory personnel. In return 
the contractor had a cheap supply of labor for manufacturing goods to be sold 
on the open market. ... So in effect, state legislatures and taxpayers had little 
cause to quarrel with the financial aspects of criminal incarceration. Costs did 
not run counter to the convenience of confining offenders. 
Yet the situation was not without problems. As early as 1823, "free labor" 
had expressed its objection to the sale of prison-made goods. In that year, 
cabinetmakers, engineering workers, and an ad hoc Workers Commission in 
New York complained of unfair competition (Commons [1921] 1966; Gill 
1931). In 1834, trade unions forced the appointment of a special commission 
by the legislature of New York to investigate the problem. The workers 
demanded an end to the contract system. The commission offered modifica­
tions in the conditions of contracts, but would not yield the contract system, 
concluding that prison work had to be productive in order to offset costs 
(Mohler 1925; Commons [1921] 1966). Given the relatively weak political 
position of trade unions at this time, legislators had little incentive to restrict 
the contract system. 
In the period just after Reconstruction, more organized and powerful 
national trade unions and, possibly more important, manufacturers, launched 
a forceful attack on convict labor. The industrial depression of 1873 had 
thrown millions of "free" laborers out of work while markets for prison 
goods dried up. Union organizations such as the Knights of Labor and the 
Federation of Organized Trades and Labor Unions carried anti-contract 
motions into the political arena. In 1883, the Tennessee Coal, Iron and Rail­
road Company hired 1,300 convicts from the state penitentiary in order to 
force wage concessions from miners. Conditions there deteriorated and, in 
1891, the free miners burned down the camp, freeing the prisoners. Only 
after a violent confrontation with the state militia was the leasing of con­
victs outlawed. 
The system was equally denounced by those manufacturers who were not 
taking advantage of low-priced prison labor. While the total value of produc­
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tion of prison industries had a minor impact on the free market system as a 
whole, it had a considerable impact within certain industries, e.g., boots and 
shoes, twine, furniture, and the like. At its convention in 1878, the Hatmakers' 
Association, for example, voiced its objection to the dissolution of business 
due to the use of prison labor in private shops. Moreover, public sentiment 
began to turn as corruption and bribery were exposed and the despotism of 
private contracting took its toll on prisoners/workers. Reports of extreme 
cruelty, miserable working conditions, and deaths began to surface, particu­
larly in the South's notorious "chain-gang" and agricultural lease systems. 
In Texas alone, for example, 224 inmates died between the years 1886 and 
1888. Rothman (1980:137) states that "while some of the deaths could be 
explained away because Negroes ostensibly were already carrying 'the seeds 
of disease/ state inspectors agreed that at least some of the contractors . . . 
[were] 'guilty of inhumane treatment.' "li The "successful" alliance created by 
state managers was crumbling . 
The "crisis" of convict labor did not go unnoticed by politicians seeking 
office who, according to McKelvy ([1936] 1977:117), "had their ears to the 
ground in the early eighties, and they revealed some ability at realpolitik if 
not in penological statecraft." During that time, the Democrats, with aid of 
the labor vote, took control over influential state governments and eventu­
ally the White House. By the end of the decade an onslaught of legislation 
arose restricting the "private" systems of contract labor and requiring some 
form of public-accounts system. In addition to appeasing organized labor, 
these "reforms" were part of a wider movement to cleanse the apparatus of 
the spoils system of political appointments to prison administrations and 
their links to private contractors. 
While most industrial states, like Pennsylvania, were quick to outlaw pri­
vate contracting (1883), the practice persisted in other states until the 1930s. 
Nevertheless, the shift toward direct public control was dramatic. In 1885, 
only five states operated exclusively and eleven partially under public-
accounts systems (U.S. Department of Labor 1887; U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics 1925). By 1923, the figures were 30 and 18, respectively, with the 
latter having some private system in place. The lease system, which ac­
counted for 26 percent of the total value of goods ($24,271,078) in 1885 was 
gone completely; public-works accounts now represented 20 percent of the 
1923 goods value of $73,820,125, up from one-tenth of one percent; and state-
use increased from 8 to over 37 percent of total value. Still pressured by 
ever-increasing costs and the need for discipline in the institutions, state 
managers turned to public-accounts systems as a compromise, but they 
were no substitute. As Gill (1931:88) points out, 
it should be noted that while the number of convicts employed in productive 
labor increased from 30,853 in 1885 to 51,779 in 1923, or 70 percent, the 
number engaged in prison duties, sick, and idle, increased from 11,024 to 
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32,962 or 199 percent. ... It appears that idleness increases as public control 
increases. Indeed, state-use and public-accounts systems were failures at 
generating revenue. 
A survey of prison industries by Robinson (1931:235-245) covering the late 
1920s concludes that, "It is plain that the great majority of American prisons 
not only fail to meet operating costs but require heavy annual appropriations." 
By 1929, the passage of the Hawes-Cooper Act, a congressional bill lobbied 
by the Garment Manufacturers' Association, severely restricted the inter­
state flow of prison goods by subjecting their sale to the laws of the state in 
which they were sold. After its passage, state after state enacted legislation 
prohibiting the sale of convict-produced goods from other states. With the 
onset of the Great Depression, and millions outside the penitentiaries 
unemployed, the issue of prison labor disappeared from the national agenda. 
IN THE INTEREST OF THE STATE: 
DISCIPLINE, PUNISHMENT, AND CAPITALISM 
Why was it, then, that the public prison came to resemble the private factory; 
whose interests did this resemblance serve, and why did the associated 
practices ultimately fail? Was the "real" intention the production of proletari­
ans as Melossi and Pavarini ([1978] 1981) contend? I would argue that there 
are considerable problems with this point of view which is narrowed by 
instrumentalism and functionalism. Who, for example, is the historical agent 
in this account? The "bourgeoisieas the authors contend? If so, why did 
manufacturers join the fight against prison labor, a fact curiously left out of 
their narrative? To assume that the essential role of the prison was the 
disciplining of the working-class is to characterize the institution as a tool 
placed squarely in the hands of an united class motivated by a definable 
agenda. Moreover, to make such an assumption places the state in an equally 
instrumental position, and thereby denies the institutional self-interest of 
the state, and neglects to consider the ways in which such self-interest 
shapes public policy. 
As for Foucault's assertion that penal labor constituted an "empty eco­
nomic form," ([1975] 1979:243) even a cursory reading of the reports of 
prison officials for the period affords clear evidence that "successful" prison 
operations were the ones that cost the least. While the Auburn plan may 
have reflected more the norms of an industrialized society, it seems hardly a 
coincidence that the years in which it was most rigorously applied were also 
the years in which prisons produced the greatest profit. 
Rothman's (1980:144) claim, on the other hand, that the failure of prison 
labor schemes reflected the inconsistency between the goals of reform and 
custodial care is quite true—at the level of the penal apparatus. However, 
his explanation falls short by not linking the enterprise to the state and 
the principles governing its own existence. 
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My contention is that the nineteenth-century American penitentiary did 
contain a goal of economic utility and this goal reflected this interest of state 
managers attempting to reproduce their position within the political structure. 
Thus, the prison came to resemble the factory because it was in the interest 
of state officials to extend the power of the state by creating a cooperative 
alliance with a segment of private capital. By doing so the state could, via its 
apparatus, accomplish its principal objectives of producing social consensus 
by confronting illegitimate behavior and of establishing order and stability. 
This, in turn, ensured general conditions of economic production (even 
within prison walls) and social integration by guaranteeing both collective 
security and the creation of social wealth. All these objectives helped to 
ensure the political legitimacy and material power of the early liberal-capitalist 
state. Thus, the state had the incentive to make prison labor as profitable as 
possible and, given the economic developments outside the prison, it had an 
interest in uniting private capital and its prison populations. In this case, 
politics at the level of the state intersected with the politics of production. 
A number of unintended consequences emerged through this intersection 
and these contradictions brought about the demise of viable prison industries. 
First, at the level of the apparatus, the state linked the prison to the eco­
nomic movements of capitalism outside the prison and, once so linked, it 
changed the character and the mission of the institution. For the majority of 
prison administrators, profitable regimes met their short-term goals of both 
discipline and managerial efficiency of the state apparatus. Thus, one conse­
quence of this linkage was the dominance of economic activity in shaping 
both policy and life in the institution. As a critical report from the Eastern 
Penitentiary characterized this coupling: 
To make a Penitentiary a manufactory in which all alike are worked together 
as part of a machinery of production, is incarceration with labor. The individ­
ual is lost sight of, uncared for, in the mass of all ages, sorts, and conditions 
of men. The man is unknown. As part of a machine he is recognized.2 5 
A second consequence of transforming the prison into a factory was that, 
as a productive enterprise, it was drawn into the contradictions inherent in 
liberal-capitalist economies. Boom and bust business cycles left stockpiled 
goods unsold, while markets for particular products dried up. Since changes 
in shift work and "layoffs" were problematic, production went on regardless 
of outside market conditions. Moreover, the prisons had to compete with 
capitalists on the outside who were constantly Introducing new machinery 
and methods to reduce labor costs or Improve products. Not only was it 
difficult for prison industries to adjust to such changes, but the idea of 
introducing "labor saving" technologies into the prison environment reflected 
the flawed logic of the state prison as an unorthodox economic form. 
Finally, and most important, production regimes were initiated during a 
period of the general acceptance of public/private "mixed" enterprises, the 
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trademark of the Accumulative State form. Yet these arrangements were 
later viewed as trespassing the boundary between the state and civil society 
as that threshold was defined in the latter half of the nineteenth century. 
While the state had little to do with the actual operation of "privatized" 
systems (a considerable advantage to the state), the prison plant and, hence, 
the private contractor, benefited from cheap or free labor, as well as subsi­
dized land and capital since overhead costs were derived from taxes rather 
than private expenditures. By providing such subsidies, the state was directly 
involved in organizing a production apparatus which was competing with 
free industry and labor. In the case of public systems, a purely state-financed 
and state-run organization was in complete violation of the "fair" rules of 
laissez-faire liberal-capitalism. As Inspector Vaux somewhat sarcastically put 
it in 1880: 
an individual commits crime, is convicted, his physical capacity to toil is sold 
to a contractor who becomes a partner with the State in the manufacture of 
certain products, and from the sale of these products the State gets part of the 
profit, the contractor gets part of the profit; while the outside free laborer is 
paid as low a price for his free time and capacity, as his employer can afford, 
to come into competition with the State as a manufacturer. This is called 
punishment of the convict for his crime.24 
In sum, when faced with rising prison populations and mounting deficits 
during the 1820s, the majority of state governments turned to private capital 
to make prisons viable economic units. They had neither the tax base to 
support expanding prison systems nor the incentive to raise taxes. During 
this period, "mixed" enterprises were not uncommon and the political weak­
ness of unorganized "free" labor permitted the state to initiate and subsidize 
production within the walls of prisons. This movement was justified, ide­
ologically, by a historically-grounded notion that prisoners should work for 
their reformation, punishment, and keep. The movement contributed to a 
half-century of a politically and economically "convenient" use of institu­
tionalization of the criminal element of society. By the 1880s, however, 
working-class resistance and organized capital had united with a reformist 
critique of abuses under the private system to create a new crisis of legiti­
mation for state governments. In order to alleviate this crisis, the reformist-
oriented industrial states began taking control of production away from 
private capital, setting up state-account and state-use systems in an attempt 
to appease criticism while continuing to try to offset the cost of the penal 
apparatus. These systems, however, failed to be economically viable and by 
the 1930s, with the onset of economic crisis, states were forced to contend 
with prisons that were holding idle and unproductive populations. 
In existence for more than fifty years, it can hardly be a coincidence that, 
with the decline of economically productive prison industries near the turn 
of the century, state and prison authorities began to expand the use of parole 
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as a way of reducing prison populations. While Rothman (1980) would have 
us believe that developments in parole were due to the ideological agenda of 
Progressive reformers, Messinger, Berecochea, Rauma, and Berk (1985) con­
tend that, at least in California, it was prison overcrowding, rather than any 
rehabilitative movement, that prompted parole expansion at this time. Clearly, 
the theoretical model of the state being employed here suggests that, while 
an overcrowded prison is problematic, a prison that is both unproductive 
and overcrowded is cause for alarm. 
CONCLUSION 
In this paper I have set out the basis of a state-centered analysis of the 
history of prison labor regimes, emphasizing the institutionalized self-interest 
of state managers in the reproduction of both the political state and of 
capitalism. In doing so, I have criticized recent revisionist writings for hav­
ing seriously under-analyzed the state and the role of state managers as 
historical subjects. My alternative view rests on the logic of a form-function-
apparatus model which outlines the structuring principles of the liberal-
capitalist state and its relationship to the economic and normative spheres 
society. The history of nineteenth century prisons illustrates the fluctuating, 
often contradictory nature of state action and policies. My interpretation 
suggests that the failures and limitations of these practices were not the 
result of the need for "better planning and administration," but rather were 
engendered by the self-obstructive nature of the policy-making capacity of 
the state itself. 
To require prisoners to labor was a notion that had almost universal accept­
ance in the early years of the nineteenth century, for it seemed to satisfy the 
concerns of all parties. The practice was, according to its advocates, the 
embodiment of punishment, deterrence, reformation, order, and economic 
retribution.2^ Few appeared willing to view these goals as potentially contra­
dictory or as having priority in their application. But the historical evidence 
suggests that this is precisely what transpired. Given the structural position 
of the liberal-capitalist state in the political economy, prisons had to be more 
than just places for "reflection." The state could not justify, ideologically or 
materially, supporting prisoners in idleness. On the other hand, there can be 
no doubt that the prison was a disciplinary apparatus or, as Bentham charac­
terized it in 1792, "A mill for grinding rogues honest, and idle men indus­
trious" (quoted in Tannenbaum 1922:152). Teaching recalcitrant citizens the 
ways of labor and thrift was also in the interest of the state, since a "suc­
cessful" reformation of the prisoner meant reintegration into market/exchange 
relations upon release and the assurance of social consensus. The "power to 
punish," then, was not so much directed by or solely in the interest of 
particular social class. Rather, it was implemented by the state seeking to 
guarantee the collective interest of all members of a class society reproduced 
through capitalist social relations. Accordingly, it was believed that the inter­
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ests of class and state, reformer and administrator, citizen, and even pris­
oner (according to those in power), were best served when the prison 
embodied what Michael Hindus has characterized as "a mix of Enlighten­
ment views on the nature of crime and an industrial-era solution to the 
problem of human weakness" (1980:165). 
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NOTES 
1. Despite this common concern, how­
ever, revisionist accounts remain fractured 
along several fronts ranging from materi­
alist interpretations (Melossi and Pavarini 
1982; Piatt 1969; Ignatieff 1978; Scull [1977] 
1984; Foucault 1977), to more functional­
ist perspectives (Rothman 1971, 1980). 
2. This general problem is taken up in a 
larger, state-centered analysis of the chang­
ing face of institutional social control in 
the U.S. from 1800 to the present of which 
this paper is part. See Staples (1991). 
3. Mann (1984) argues that, within a 
state-centered model, the state is an arena 
and that this is precisely the basis of its 
autonomy. Society-centered perspectives 
rarely acknowledge such autonomy. 
4. Thus the use of term "factory" is, in 
essence, a metaphor for production organ­
ized around capitalist or quasi-capitalist 
principles. 
5. I consider people who derive their 
principal occupational, professional, and 
material existence from the state appara­
tus as a social class not unlike any other. 
This class exhibits an internal hierarchical 
structure of power and interest—from 
elected politicians to career bureaucrats, 
to the administrative, technical, and staff 
personnel of the state apparatus. No mat­
ter what their position, state actors are 
social agents who draw upon the power, 
authority, and material resources available 
to them in order to reproduce the state 
and their place within it. Like other social 
classes, however, state managers and per­
sonnel are rarely united on specific issues 
or policies. Their interests are often frag­
mented relative to their location in the 
state hierarchy and in terms of intra-agency 
competition for resources, organizational 
jurisdiction, and professional status. 
6. Here the basic organizing principles 
revolve around the relationship between 
wage labor and capital and as anchored in 
civil law. The liberal-capitalist state is pri­
marily a decentralized and localized body. 
It is dependent on both the presence and 
continuity of private accumulation through 
its reliance on materials created in that 
process and on budgetary resources de­
rived through taxation. Yet, while depend­
ent on private production, the liberal-
capitalist state is primarily excluded from 
directly organizing or coordinating com­
modity production. This "capitalist-state" 
is not, however, reducible to capital itself; 
it is a unique institution, embedded within 
a wider social formation, possessing power 
for autonomous action. 
7. The term "Accumulative State" is de­
rived from the work of Alan Wolfe (1977) 
and is used here as a descriptive meta­
phor of state activities during the period. 
Wolfe's own theoretical assumptions, how­
ever, are more society-centered than state-
centered. 
8. The principle of laissez-faire, so close­
ly identified with the nineteenth century, 
became a dominant ideology only after the 
sufficient growth of private sources of 
capital. 
9. These functions involve, in one way 
or another, the necessity of autonomous 
state action in the reproduction of both 
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the state itself—in terms of political legiti­
macy and material power—as well as the 
wider social formation—in terms of coor­
dinating economic exchange and ensuring 
the stability of class relations. 
10. A contradiction in this sense is an 
opposing or disjunctive condition to the 
structuring principles necessary for social 
reproduction (Giddens [1979] (1983). 
11. "Production regimes" are conceived 
of as the political regulation of production 
which may be independent of the organi­
zation of production or the labor process. 
12. Of course, penal labor did not origi­
nate in America; it appeared in the Am­
sterdam Rasphuis and Spinhuis as early as 
1596. One anonymous reviewer suggested 
that this prior development calls into ques­
tion my attempt to link the appearance of 
production-oriented penal labor schemes 
to the rise of the liberal-capitalist state. 
Yet, I would argue, consistent with a 
"world-systems" viewpoint that, indeed, 
capitalism had already taken a foothold in 
the Dutch city at this time, and, while 
considered by many a "weak" state, the 
United Provinces consisted of a "political 
elite which held . .. power over taxation, 
justice, and the local economy" (Braudel 
[1979] 1986:196). 
13. From Vaux (1826), Notices of the Origi­
nal and Successive Attempts to Improve the 
Discipline of the Prison at Philadelphia and to 
Reform the Criminal Code of Pennsylvania, as 
quoted in Barnes (1927:87-91). 
14. Report of the Commissioners on the Penal 
Code (1828:19). 
15. Of course, data on the performance 
of prisons industries must be treated with 
caution, given the incentive of officials to 
inflate figures. Yet, while the prisons may 
not have made an actual profit, it seems 
clear from the available sources that state 
appropriations to the institutions did di­
minish when private contractors were in­
volved. 
16. Annual Report of the Inspectors of the 
Eastern Penitentiary (1855:8-9). 
17. Annual Report of the Inspectors of the 
Eastern Penitentiary (1880:7). 
18. Annual Report of the Inspectors of the 
Eastern Penitentiary (1837:5). 
19. The Report of the Prison Investigating 
Committee, 1830. [Reports of the New Jer­
sey Legislature are reproduced in their 
entirety in Barnes (1918). This material is 
on pp. 396-425.] 
20. Report of the joint Committee of Council 
and Assembly on the Erection of the New State 
Prison ( in Barnes 1918:441). 
21. Annual Report of the Inspectors of the 
Western Penitentiary (1867:8). 
22. See the Texas Penitentiary Commit­
tee, Report of Findings (1913). 
23. Annual Report of the Inspectors of the 
Eastern Penitentiary (1884:10-11). 
24. Annual Report of the Inspectors of the 
Eastern Penitentiary (1880:7). 
25. For a contemporary example of this 
phenomenon see Staples (1986). 
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